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RANDALL  KENNEDY*
I agree  with  Mr.  Rowan  that Justice Thurgood Marshall's  now
famous remarks on the bicentennial observance of the United States
Constitution'  provided a necessary critique of the uncritical celebra-
tion.  Although one might have thought that much of what the Jus-
tice noted would be familiar, and even banal,  to anyone moderately
knowledgeable  about  American  history,  the expressions  of dismay
triggered  by his comments suggest that public education  about the
Nation's past is urgently needed.  It should be noted, moreover, that
neitherJustice  Marshall's  speech nor the controversy surrounding it
have  drawn  any attention  to  what  blacks  in  pre-Civil War America
thought about the handiwork  of the founding fathers.
Justice Marshall and Mr. Rowan suggest by implication that, ab-
sent the  Civil War Amendments, they would be unwilling to pledge
allegiance to the Constitution of the United States.  Their words dis-
play  an unflinching repudiation of the constitutional regime that ex-
isted prior to  1865.  The logic of that position is easy to understand.
After  all,  the legal  systems  of most  states  and the  federal  govern-
ment  radically  negated  equality  for  black  people  in  antebellum
America.2  Most were slaves;  even  so-called "free"  blacks were  sub-
ject, in  both the North and South, to many  restrictions.  In several
states  blacks  were  not allowed  to  testify  in  cases  in  which  a  white
person was  a party.3  Almost  all  excluded blacks from  sitting on ju-
ries.4  Many excluded  blacks from the franchise. 5  Some passed laws
or enacted  constitutional  amendments  forbidding  blacks  to  enter
*  Assistant  Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  Law  School.  B.A.,  Princeton  University,
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1.  T.  Marshall,  Remarks  at  the  Annual  Seminar  of the San  Francisco  Patent  and
Trademark  Association  in  Maui,  Hawaii  (May  6,  1987)  (available  at  the  Varvland Law
Review).
2.  See  generally  D.  FEHRENBACHER,  THE  DRED  SCOTT CASE:  ITS  SIGNIFICANCE  IN
AMERICAN  LAW  AND  POLITICS  (1978);  A.  HIGGONBOTHAM,  IN  THE  MATrER  OF  COLOR:
RACE  AND  THE  AMERICAN  LEGAL  PROCESS:  THE  COLONIAL  PERIOD  (1978);  I.  BERLIN,
SLAVES WITHOUT  MASTERS:  THE  FREE  NEGRO  IN  THE  ANTEBELLUM  SOUTH (1974);  L.
LITWACK,  NORTH  OF  SLAVERY:  THE  NEGRO  IN  THE  FREE  STATES,  1790-1860  (1961);
Finkelman, Prelude  to the Fourteenth Amendment:  Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum  North,  17
RUTGERS  L.J.  415 (1986).
3.  L.  LITWACK, supra note  2,  at 93.
4.  Id. at 94.
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their territory.6  And Arkansas, just  before  the Civil  War, passed  a
law directing its "free"  black residents  to  leave within  a year or risk
enslavement.
7
Against  this  backdrop,  consider the  following  statement made
in  the  opening editorial  of the first  black  newspaper  in  the United
States.  Writing in  1827,  the editors of Freedom 'sJournal  declared  that
"in  our discussion of political subjects we shall ever regard the Con-
stitution  of the  United  States  as our  political  star."'  Or consider
this  statement  made  by  a  noted  black  abolitionist  in  1851  at  the
State  Convention of Ohio Negroes.  Engaged  in  a  debate  over  the
stance  blacks  ought  to adopt  toward  the federal  constitution,  Wil-
liam  Howard  Day declared:
[C]oming  as  I do,  in the midst  of three millions  of men in
chains, and five hundred thousand only half free, I consider
every instrument precious  that guarantees  to me liberty.  I
consider the Constitution  the  foundation  of American  lib-
erties,  and wrapping myself in the flag of the nation,  I  ...
plant myself upon  the Constitution  ...  and appeal  to  the
American  people  for the  rights thus  guaranteed. 9
Other voices  expressed  contrary  views.  Addressing  a  meeting
of the American  Anti-Slavery  Society  in  1847,  Frederick  Douglass
maintained:
I  have  no  patriotism.  I  have  no  country.  . . . The only
thing that links me to this land is my family, and the painful
consciousness  that here there are  three millions  of my fel-
low creatures,  groaning beneath  the iron  rod of the worst
despotism ever devised....  I cannot have any love for this
country  or  for  its  Constitution.  I  desire  to  see  it  over-
thrown  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  its  Constitution
shivered in  a thousand  fragments.'
Other  blacks  were  equally  frustrated  and  discouraged.  Some
were  so convinced  that the  United  States  was  destined  to remain  a
"white  man's  country"  that they migrated  to Canada, England,  the
6.  Id. at  72-74.
7.  I.  BERLIN,  supra  note 2, at 372-74.
8.  See  R.  DICK,  BLACK  PROTEST:  ISSUES  AND  TACTICS  44  (1974).
9.  See  I A  DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY  OF THE NEGRO  PEOPLE IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  318
(H.  Aptheker ed.  1951).
10.  R.  DICK,  supra note  8,  at  59.  Later,  however,  Douglass  became  the  leading
spokesman  for black abolitionists who  construed the Constitution as  an antislavery  doc-
ument.  For a useful  discussion of the evolution of Douglass'  thinking on this issue, see
W.  MARTIN,  THE  MIND  OF  FREDERICK  DOUGLASS  18-54  (1984).
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Carribean,  and various  countries  in Africa."
Most of those who could have left, however, chose not to do so.
They remained, urged fellow blacks to stay in the United States, and
deliberately pledged allegiance to the Constitution even though the
Supreme  Court consistently interpreted  it in a proslavery  fashion.' 2
Why did they embrace  the Constitution?  The principal reason  was
pragmatic:  constitutionalism  was  and  is  America's  civil  religion.'"
Most black abolitionists  sought to prevent their enemies  from com-
pletely  mastering  the  document's  influential  symbolism.  One  of
their  primary  means  of struggle  was  an  activity  that  has  recently
emerged  from academic obscurity  to become  front page  news:  the
practice of constitutional  interpretation.
Black abolitionists, inspired in large part by ideas pioneered  by
white allies,"  became heroic readers who transformed  the Constitu-
tion into  a platform  more hospitable  to  their needs,  a platform  far
more decent than that created by the antebellum Supreme Court.  A
brief mention  of two of the  ways  in which  they sought to make the
Constitution their own will illustrate the essential nature of their en-
terprise  and  the ironic ways  in which  it resonates  with issues  rele-
vant  to the  controversies  of our own moment.
First, a  principal tenet  of black abolitionists  who sought to use
the  Constitution  against  slavery  was  that  the document  should  be
strictly construed.  Just  as  strict constructionism  is now the rallying
cry of the conservative movement, so too was strict constructionism
the rallying cry of at least some abolitionist  radicals.  They insisted
upon a  literal  reading  because  the bare  language  of the founders'
Constitution made no mention either of slavery  or of the color line.
The  document  states  that  "We  the  People"-not  "We  the  white
male people"-but  simply  "We  the People  of the United States,  in
Order  to  form a  more  perfect  Union,  establish Justice,  insure  do-
mestic Tranquility  ...  promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings  of Liberty  to ourselves  and  our Posterity,  do ordain  and
establish  this Constitution  for the  United States  of America."' 5
Second, black antislavery constitutionalists,  refusing to consider
the original intent of the framers, construed  in innovative ways  vari-
1I.  See generally S.  MILLER,  THE  SEARCH  FOR  A BLACK  NATIONALITY:  BLACK  IMMIGRA-
TION  AND  COLORIZATION,  1787-1863  (1975).
12.  See generally D.  FEHRENBACHER,  supra note 2.
13.  See generally Levinson,  "'The Constitution"  in American Civil Religion,  1979 Sup.  CT.
REV.  123.
14.  See generally W.  WIECEK,  THE  SOURCES  OF  ANTISLAVERY  CONSTITUTIONALISM  IN
AMERICA,  1760-1848  (1977).
15.  U.S.  CONST.  preamble.
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ous clauses conventionally  described  as proslavery.  As traditionally
understood,  article  I,  section  2 of the Constitution 6  represented  a
compromise  under which  the slave  states were able  to  count their
slaves as part of the population  for purposes of political representa-
tion.' 7  Interpreting  the  infamous  three-fifths  clause  in  a  fashion
Walt Whitman would have appreciated, Is  antislavery constitutional-
ists maintained  that the  clause was abolitionist in nature because  it
comprised
a  downright  disability  laid  upon  the  slaveholding  states,
one which deprives those states of two fifths of their natural
basis of representation.  A black man in a free state is worth
just two  fifths more than  a  black man  in  a  slave state....
Therefore  instead  of encouraging  slavery,  [this  clause  of
the Constitution]  encouraged  freedom.' 9
Similarly, article  I,  section  8,  clause  15 of the Constitution has
been  viewed  as  proslavery  in intent.2"  It  provides  that  Congress
shall have  power to call  forth  the militia to suppress  insurrections,
including,  of course,  slave uprisings.  Antislavery  constitutionalists
suggested, however, that this language could be read to endow Con-
gress with  the power to eradicate  the evil that  gave rise to slave in-
surrections:  slavery  itself.
Some may see these novel interpretations as strategems entitled
to nothing  more  than  recognition  for  their  cleverness.  I  suggest,
however,  that  holders  of that  view  consider  the  long  line  of in-
stances  in  which  heroic,  counter-intuitive  interpretations  have
served  the  Nation  well.  After  all,  the  antislavery  reading  of the
three-fifths  clause  was  no more  improbable than  the  unprecedent-
edly expansive reading that the Supreme Court began to give to the
16.  The  section  specifically  states  that representation  in  the  House of Representa-
tives shall be based on the number of free persons  in a state and "three  fifths of  all other
Persons."
17.  See,  e.g.,  S.  LYND,  The Abolitionist Critique of the  United States Constitution, in  CLAss
CONFLICT,  SLAVERY,  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  CONSTITUTION  153  (1967);  D.  ROBINSON,
SLAVERY  IN THE  STRUCTURE  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS,  1765-1820,  at 201  (1971)  (the three-
fifths  clause  "acknowledged  slavery and rewarded  slaveholders").
18.  See  W.  WHITMAN,  Democratic  Vistas,  in  WALT  WHITMAN:  POETRY  AND  PROSE  992
(Library of Am.  ed.  1982)  ("[Tjhe process of reading  is not a half-sleep,  but,  in highest
sense, an  exercise,  a gymnast's  struggle.").
19.  F.  Douglass,  Speech at  Glasgow,  Scotland  (March  26,  1860),  reprinted in  2 THE
LIFE  AND  WRITINGS  OF  FREDERICK  DOUGLASS  (P. Foner ed.  1950).
20.  See S. LYND, snpra note  17.  BIti  see D.  ROBINSON, snpra note  17,  at  218 (suggesting
that framers'  concern  was not with slave uprisings but rather with uprisings by dissident
whites).
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interstate commerce clause during the New Deal era.2'  What makes
the abolitionist interpretation  seem so unorthodox is that it failed to
obtain authoritative validation through conventional  legal channels.
Thus, it failed  to socialize succeeding  generations into accepting  it.
The antebellum blacks  who pledged allegiance to the founders'
Constitution perceived  the essential  point that words  do not speak
for  themselves.  They  realized  the  importance  of  interpretation.
They revelled in  the plasticity  of language.  They refused  to be in-
timidated  by  those  who insisted  that  constitutional  provisions  can
have  only  one  possible  interpretation.  They  understood  that  the
Constitution  is  as decent or indecent,  as progressive  or reactionary
as  "We  the  People"  make it.
21.  Compare Schechter Poultry Corp.  v.  United States,  295 U.S.  495  (1935)  (no con-
gressional authority under commerce clause to regulate  intrastate poultry  slaughtering)
with  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.  1  1 (1942)  (congressional authority  under commerce
clause  to  regulate wheat grown  by  farmer to feed own  family).
[VOL.  47:46